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INTRODUCTION
Historians estimate that between $230 and $320 billion in assets were
stolen, including an estimated $20.5 billion in artwork, as a result of Adolph
Hitler's regime during the Second World War.1 The unprecedented theft of
Europe's art collections included more than 240,000 artworks from
museums and private collections being displaced, transported and stolen by
1944.2 It is estimated that the scale of looted European art during the Nazi
period exceeded that of all the Napoleonic Wars combined.
Interestingly enough, the primary difference between the looting and
confiscation of art during the Second World War and prior wars was that
for the first time in history, armed forces consisted of "highly trained art
specialists in their ranks, whose duty it was to secure and preserve movable
works of art, and whose professionalism" saved most of the artworks from
complete destruction.4 This act of professionalism, however, did not stem
JD Candidate, 2006, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 Emily A. Maples, Comment, Holocaust Art: It Isn't Always "Finders Keepers, Losers
Weepers": A Look at Art Stolen During the Third Reich, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 355,
356 (2001).
2 Alexander Minkovich, Note, The Successful Use of Laches in World War II-Era Art
Theft Disputes: It's Only a Matter of Time, 27 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349, 352 (2004);
Kelly Diane Walton, Leave No Stone Unturned: The Search for Art Stolen by the Nazis and
the Legal Rules Governing Restitution of Stolen Art, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 549, 558 (1999).
3 HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAzI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD'S
GREATEST WORKS OF ART 23 (1997).
4 Stephan J. Schlegelmilch, Note, Ghosts of the Holocaust: Holocaust Victim Fine Arts
Litigation and A Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 87,
92 (1999); Lynn H. Nicholas, World War I and the Displacement of Art and Cultural
Property, in THE SPOILS OF WAR: WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE Loss,
REAPPEARANCE, AND RECOVERY OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 39 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997).
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from philanthropic ideology, but rather it reflected the sophistication of
Hitler's art campaign. The purpose was two-fold: the Nazis looted art to
"promote (and return to Germany) what in their view were examples of
superior art and culture" and to eradicate the Jewish race by annihilating its
culture as a part of their "Final Solution." 5 For this task, Hitler ordered the
removal of 16,000 pieces of art from state collections.6 Finding them
insufficient, Hitler turned his focus towards the looting of private art
collections following the occupation of Austria.7
The Nazis designated the Galerie Nationale du Jeu de Paume as its
central repository, where more than 400 crates of confiscated artwork were
deposited, unpacked and marked for inventory. 8 Of the more than 400
crates of confiscated artwork, an estimated three-fourths of the artworks
were confiscated by the middle of 1941, less than one year after the German
invasion.9 At the Jeu de Paume, the confiscated works "were divided up
and, depending on their quality and desirability, either transported to
Germany or put up for sale.'
0
As a result, Hitler systematically acquired the most desirable art in
Europe." Similar to Napoleon's looting of Egypt, Hitler sought to capture
the best European art from the 1500s to the 1930s in order to establish a
great museum in his hometown of Linz, Austria. 12 In doing so, Hitler
sought to repatriate works of his "German heritage" and to house works by
those artists "whom Hitler found most culturally valuable."' 13 The Nazis
targeted "pure Northern European art of the highest order."' 4 Artists that
reflected this Nazi aesthetic ideology included, "Vermeer, Pieter Bruegel
the Elder, Rembrandt, Hals, Fragonard, Van Eyck and Dilrer."'15
In the German war of conquest, Hitler and his officials also targeted
modern degenerate art. "Degenerate art" referred to art that either depicted
Jewish subjects, was critical of Germany, or contradicted the Nazi ideology.
Hitler also viewed artworks by modern masters such as Van Gogh, Chagall
and Picasso to be as inferior as the Jews themselves due to their
5 Minkovich, supra note 2, at 352.
6 Maples, supra note 1, at 358.
7 Id.
8 FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 105-07.
9 JONATHAN PETROPOULOS, ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH 131 (1996).
10 FELICIANO, supra note 3, at 108.
11 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 93.
12 John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Repatriations
Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 1,
81 (2004); Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 93-94.
13 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 93-94.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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exaggerated and revolutionary depictions of the human figure. 16 Modem or
abstract works by Pissarro and Matisse, as well as works displaying forms
of Dadaism, Futurism and Cubism were also included in this targeted
group. 17 Despite his personal distaste of "degenerate art," Hitler did not
destroy these pieces, but rather intended to use them as bargaining pieces
once a peace treaty was signed with conquered countries, such as France,
Belgium and Holland.
1 8
Although Hitler never ended up using these artworks as he intended,
the displacement of Europe's art treasures continued well after Hitler's
demise and the end of the Second World War. Two days after the liberation
of Paris, the Allied forces tried to recover the looted artworks that they
discovered in "mines, hidden vaults, monasteries, office buildings, homes
and even medieval castles."' 9 In the midst of the confusion surrounding the
German collapse, much of the systematic nature of Hitler's looting was
undone.20  Despite the Allied forces' attempts to salvage, catalogue and
repatriate the "huge caches of art treasures," looting by members of the
Allied forces occurred as well.2'
More than fifty years after the fall of Hitler's regime, Europe's cultural
treasures have gradually resurfaced in private collections, galleries, art
catalogues, auctions and museums all over the world. The murky
provenance of some of these artworks and their association with the
Holocaust did not deter art collectors from purchasing an impressive
collection of European art, never before available in this scale.22 Since the
initial theft of the artwork by the Nazis and the artworks' subsequent
displacement, some of these works of art have crossed international borders
and changed hands numerous times. 23 "The sheer number of pieces stolen
during the war, the extent of their subsequent distribution, and the length of
time that has since passed" make the possibility of an individual nation
addressing the problem within its own borders all the more impractical.24
Immediately after the Second World War, European countries passed
laws that aimed to return works of art to their original owners.2  But
16 id.
17 Maples, supra note 1, at 358.
18 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 93-94.
'9 Id. at 95.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Ian Traynor, Precious Plunder, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2001, at 56.
23 Id. at 118; Paulina McCarter Collins, Comment, Has "The Lost Museum" Been
Found? Declassification of Government Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets Offer
Real Opportunity to "Do Justice "for Holocaust Victims on the Issue of Nazi-Looted Art, 54
ME. L. REV. 115, 118 (2002).
24 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 91.
25 Stephanie Cuba, Note, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of Limitations
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 26:167 (2005)
despite these efforts, many works went unclaimed and were later deposited
with national museums.26 Only about half of the looted art has been
returned to the owners or their heirs.27 According to Ronald Lauder, former
U.S. Ambassador to Austria and now Chairman of the Museum of Modem
Art in New York, "more than 100,000 pieces of art, worth at least $10
billion in total, are still missing from the Nazi era., 28 The Republic of
Austria v. Altmann case has became one in a growing series of claims of
Nazi-looted art that, although previously centered in Europe for decades,
has now been transported to the United States. To date, Nazi-looted works
have been found in major as well as mid-sized U.S. museums, art galleries
and private collections, triggering domestic and international claims.29
Plaintiffs, nevertheless, face enormous legal barriers, such as choice of
law, sovereign immunity and statute of limitations, in establishing
ownership over Nazi-looted art.30 Most cases follow this fact pattern. The
whereabouts of the looted artwork remains unknown for decades. When it
is discovered, the artwork is often in the hands of a good faith purchaser
who claims to have valid title to the artwork. Furthermore, the artwork is
likely to have appreciated in value in the past seventy years to further
complicate any Possible resolution between the original owner and the good
faith purchaser. 1 With the Supreme Court's recent decision in Republic of
Austria v. Altmann to extend subject matter jurisdiction over Nazi-looted art
against a foreign sovereign, Holocaust victims will now, more than ever,
seek redress in U.S. courts for the return of their stolen property.32 As the
restitution of Nazi-looted art is left for courts to decide on a case by case
scenario, the number and complexity of original owner versus good-faith
purchaser disputes over stolen art will only continue.
In this note, I will show how Republic of Austria v. Altmann, while
seemingly advancing the reparation of Nazi-looted art claims, undermines
the stability of the international art market and the ultimate ability of future
claimants to successfully recover their artwork due to inconsistent
on Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 CARDOZOARTS& ENT. L.J 447, 475 (1999).
26 THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, Spoliation ofJewish Cultural Property, at
http://icom.museum/spoliation.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
27 STUART EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND THE
UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR 11194 (2003).
28 Marilyn E. Phelan, Scope of Due Diligence Investigation in Obtaining Title to
Valuable Artwork, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 631, 660 (2000).
29 Ronen Sarraf, The Value of Borrowed Art, 25 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 729, 748 (1999).
30 Cohan, supra note 12, at 69.
31 Lori J. Parker, Proofofa Claim Involving Stolen Art or Antiquities, 77 AM. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS 3d § 259 (2005).32 See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005) (Holocaust survivors'
lost-property claims against the Vatican Bank and others for profits from looted assets and
slave labor).
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application of state and federal statutes. Part I will summarize the recent
Supreme Court decision of Republic of Austria v. Altmann and its claim
against a foreign country for the return of Nazi-looted art. Part II will
examine what current legal protections exist to buffer the threat of litigation
over Nazi-looted artwork that is on loan to museums. Part III will then
focus on how these laws are applied in recent cases that have arisen after
Republic of Austria v. Altmann and analyze their implications for potential
claimants and future defendants. Lastly, Part IV will advocate for a
uniform and transparent set of rules that will encourage resolution of art
title claims between the original owners, its heirs or assigns, and the good
faith purchaser without fear of being subject to outcome determinative
jurisdictions, inconsistent judicial processes, and undesired seizures of
artworks.
I. REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA V ALTMANN
At issue in Republic of Austria v. Altmann was a Holocaust victim's
longstanding effort to reclaim six paintings looted by the Nazis in the
1930's. 33 One of the disputed paintings, "Adele Bloch-Bauer I" is arguably
the most famous Gustav Klimt portrait apart from "The Kiss." A prime
example of the so-called "golden style," the painting's intricate
ornamentation, particularly of the subject's dress, dissolves behind the
golden surface. Only the most attentive eye will detect a silhouette of a
chair upon which the subject mysteriously floats. As with Byzantine idols,
only the face and the hands of the subject's body are depicted, while the
mere outline of her cascading dress and coat hints at the figure's body.34
The thin, delicate dress straps belie the weight of her richly adorned dress,
thus adding to the painting's ethereal quality. Meanwhile, strangely flat and
iconic images of Egyptian god's-eye motifs and other stylized geometric
shapes and designs float over the fabric of her dress. The juxtaposition of
the flat, ornamental design with Klimt's delicate modeling of the subject's
face and hands contributes to the painting's compositional ambiguity. 3y
This portrait with its "mosaics of unprecedented splendor," as referred
to by Klimt himself, evidently held a special significance for him, as
evidenced by the more than 100 preparatory drawings he made of the• • 36
subject over a period of several years. As one commentator notes, Klimt's
treatment of gold in the paintings is "reminiscent of Egyptian [evocations]
33 Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'g 142 F. Supp. 2d
1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
34 GUSTAV KLIMT, KLIMT'S WOMEN 115 (Tobias G. Natter & Gerbert Frodl eds.,
2000).
35 Id.
36 Id.; GERBERT FRODL, GUSTAV KLIMT IN THE AUSTRIAN GALLERY BELVEDERE IN VIENNA
54 (Nicholas T. Parsons trans., The Austrian Gallery ed., 1995).
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to eternity, the profanity of medieval gold-ground panel painting, but also
the exoticism of Japanese lacquer painting." 37 Viewed as "an universally
valid celebration of a beautiful woman," the painting graced the subject
with all the sumptuousness and ornamentation befitting an empress.38 The
subject in the portrait however is not an empress but rather Maria
Altmann's aunt, Adele Bloch-Bauer.
Maria Altmann is the 89-year old niece and heir of Ferdinand Bloch-
Bauer, a Czechoslovakian Jew, art patron and wealthy sugar magnate. 39 As
the sole living heir to the estate of her Jewish uncle, Maria Altmann brought
suit against the Austrian Gallery to recover six Gustav Klimt paintings that
the Nazis took from her uncle's house during the Second World War.40
Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer and his wife, Adele, were great patrons of the arts.
Ferdinand had commissioned Klimt to paint two portraits of his wife,
Adele, as well as four landscape paintings. After Adele's death from
meningitis at the age of 43 in 1925, the six paintings adorned the walls of
Adele's memorial room.4 1 In her will, Adele asked her husband to consider
donating the six paintings to the Austrian Gallery upon his death.42 She,
however, would not witness all the events that would transpire and
ultimately impact her husband's final decision. In his last will, written in
1945 a month before he died while in exile in Switzerland, Ferdinand left
his entire estate, including the six Gustav Klimt paintings, to Altmann and
two of her siblings.43 Dr. Erich Fuerher, the Nazi lawyer responsible for
liquidating Ferdinand's collection during the Holocaust, gave two of the
paintings, "Adele Bloch-Bauer I" and the "Apple Tree I," to the Austrian
Gallery in 1941 in exchange for the "Schloss Kammer am Atersee III," a
painting that Ferdinand had previously donated to the museum in 1936.
44
This purported gift was accompanied by a note, signed "Heil Hitler," in
which Dr. Fuerher claimed to be making the donation in fulfillment of
Ferdinand's wife, Adele Bloch-Bauer's last will and testament.45
In 1948, Altmann asked Austria to return a large number of artworks
previously owned by her uncle. Austria agreed to export some items to
Altmann but only in exchange for ceding ownership of five Klimt paintings
to the Gallery. Fifty years later, Austria enacted postwar restitution laws to
37 KLIMT, supra note 34, at 116.
38 FRODL, supra note 36, at 54.
39 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 958.
40 Id.
41 Meryl Conant, Whose Art Thou? A Woman's or a Nation s?, MEDILL NEWS SERV.,
May 10, 2004, at http://docket.medill.northwestem.edu/archives/000163.php.
42 Id.
43 id.
44 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 959.
45 Id.
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facilitate the return of expropriated artwork and effectively voided any
illegitimate transactions that were disguised as donations in exchange for
export permits. While the restitution committee ordered the return of some
items, they voted against the return of the Klimt paintings to Altmann.
They claimed that the five paintings belonged to the Austrian National
Gallery because the paintings were rightfully donated to the allery by
Ferdinand who had a legal obligation to fulfill his wife's promise.
In 1999, Altmann filed suit against the Republic of Austria in an
Austrian court to reclaim the paintings, but voluntarily dismissed the case
due to prohibitive court filing fees, a common practice in most European
courts.4  Unable to bring suit in Austria, she then refiled her lawsuit in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California alleging
expropriation of property in violation of international law against Austria
and the Austrian Gallery, an instrumentality of the Republic.48
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act4 9
Foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities are generally immune
from suit in U.S. courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA"). Altmann, however, relied on the Act's "expropriation
exception," which expressly exempts from immunity all cases involving
"rights in property taken in violation of international law, provided the
property has a commercial connection to the United States or the agency or
instrumentality that owns the property is engaged in commercial activity [in
the United States.]",50 Altmann argued that the Austrian Gallery's present
day publishing and advertising activities of the Klimt paintings in the
United States satisfied the commercial activity condition.51 The Republic of
Austria, on the other hand, argued that it was immune from the jurisdiction
of U.S. federal and state courts under the FSIA because the alleged
misappropriation in 1948 occurred prior to the FSIA's enactment in 1952.52
Up until the Altman case, most courts interpreted the FSIA to have no
retroactive applicability to lawsuits involving acts conducted prior to
1952. 53
46 Dana Goodyear, Family Portrait, NEW YORKER, Oct. 25, 2004, at 34.
47 Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Conant, supra
note 41.
48 Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
4' 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2005).
50 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 685 (2004), affg 327 F.3d 1246 (9th
Cir. 2003), on remand 377 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004), dismissed by 335 F. Supp. 2d 1066
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2004).
51 Id. at 707.
52 Altmann, 317 F.3d at 954.
53 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3662 (3d
ed. 1998).
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Prior to 1952, the United States adhered to an absolute theory of
sovereign immunity, whereby foreign sovereigns were absolutely immune
from suit in U.S. courts 4 As a result, the U.S. federal courts generally
deferred to the request of the State Department and granted immunity "in
all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns" as a matter of "grace and
comity on the part of the United States. 55 This changed in 1952 when the
acting legal advisor for the State Department, Jack Tate, wrote a letter to
acting Attorney General Philip Perlman announcing a new approach to
sovereign immunity that permitted foreign sovereigns to remain immune
from suit regarding their public or sovereign acts, but not their private or
strictly commercial acts. 6
The United States' switch from an absolute theory to the "restrictive
theory" of narrowed the protection afforded by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity to suits involving a foreign sovereign.57 Without a formal rule
applying the new restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, however,
foreign nations continued to place diplomatic pressure on the State
Department. The State Department was left with the task of "trying to
apply a legal standard without the benefit of judicial procedure., 58 Political
and diplomatic considerations also "led to suggestions of immunity where it
was not available under the restrictive theory. 59  What resulted was an
unworkable, de facto division of authority between the State Department
and the judiciary branch in granting sovereign immunity.
In response to the lack of clarity concerning the granting of sovereign
immunity, Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976.60 The FSIA's enactment
formally adopted the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity and placed
the discretion of granting sovereign immunity squarely with the courts.6'
The FSIA was more than simply a jurisdictional statute; rather, it became
the "codification of the standards governing foreign sovereign immunity as
an aspect of substantive federal law., 62 As a result, the FSIA is currently
"the sole basis for obtaining subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign state,
54 Rodney M. Zerbe, Immunity from Seizure for Artworks on Loan to United States
Museum, 6 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1121, 1127 (1984-85).
55 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (emphasis added).
56 Id.
17 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8-9 (1976) (citing 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952)),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606-08.
58 Jeremy Ledger Ross, Note, Escaping the Hourglass of Statutory Retroactivity Analysis
in Republic ofAustria v. Altmann, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (2005).
59 Danielle Ducaine, Expectations of Immunity: Removing the Barriers to Retroactive
Application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to Pre-1952 Events, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L
& CoMp. L. REV. 697, 723, n. 51 (2003).
60 Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2005).
61 Republic ofAus., 541 U.S. at 690.
62 Id. at 695 (emphasis in original).
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its agencies, or its instrumentalities."6 3  Thus, in Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, U.S. courts would have subject matter jurisdiction over the case if
the FSIA applied retroactively to conduct preceding its enactment and to
conduct preceding the adoption of the "restrictive theory" of sovereign
immunity by the United States in 1952.
B. The Court's Decision
In 2004, by a vote of six to three, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
FSIA did in fact apply to pre-1952 conduct.6 4  As a result, the Court
changed the face of the FSIA and reversed years of precedent to the
contrary.65 The Court in Altmann decided that the Austrian government
could not expect immunity in light of its complicity in and perpetuation of
the expropriation of the Klimt paintings.66 The Supreme Court allowed
subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and held that the statute applies
to preenactment conduct and that "claims of foreign states to immunity
should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the
States in conformity with the principles [herein]." 67
The Altmann case attracted much attention from not only the art
community, but also from the State Department and other foreign nations.
The U.S. government submitted a friend-of-the-court brief and participated
in oral arguments on behalf of Austria to express its concerns over the
potential for the Altmann decision to open the door to other suits against
foreign nations in U.S. courts.68  Deputy Solicitor General Thomas G.
Hungar stressed to the Court the need for resolution through "diplomatic
negotiations and foreign claims processes, and not in U.S. courts. 6 9
Contrary to popular belief of the decision's potential detrimental effects on
foreign policy, Altmann has become a purely statutory holding that is both
narrow and case specific. The case does not rule against the specific
defenses that can be used by foreign sovereigns, nor prohibit the State
63 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 53.
64 Republic ofAus., 541 U.S. at 677.
65 See Carl Marks & Co., Inc. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1988); Jackson v. P.R.C., 794 F.2d 1490 (lth Cir. 1986); Djordjevich v.
Bundesminister Der Finanzen, F.R.G., 827 F. Supp. 814 (D.D.C. 1993).
66 Republic of Aus., 541 U.S. at 677.
67 Id; Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 (2005).
68 Mexico, Japan, and France also submitted briefs to the Supreme Court. See Brief of
Amici Curiae Japan in Support of Petitioners, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677
(2004) (No. 03-13); Brief of Amici Curiae, Societe Nationale Des Chemins de fer Francais
in Support of Neither Party, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (No. 03-
13); Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (Mexico), Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (No. 03-13).
69 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 15, Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (No. 03-13).
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Department from filing statements of interest urging the court to decline
jurisdiction. Lastly, the Court also left open the possibility of courts
deferring to the Executive branch under the Act of State doctrine. The Act
of State doctrine prevents U.S. courts from sitting "in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory. 70 Under this
doctrine, every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state and any redress of grievances arising from acts
should be obtained through diplomatic channels.7'
In the aftermath of the Altmann decision, the Supreme Court remanded
for reconsideration two pending cases involving pre-1952 conduct.72
Despite these cases' survival on jurisdictional questions, the Court
dismissed the cases upon reconsideration under the political question
doctrine and reasons of comity.73 Thus, substantial obstacles remain and
must be overcome in order to bring a claim against foreign sovereigns in
federal court even after the Altmann decision.
The Supreme Court remanded Republic of Austria v. Altmann to a
California district court. Despite Austria's attempts to dismiss the case,
District Court Judge Florence-Marie Cooper denied the motion to dismiss
on September 8, 2004 and the trial was tentatively set to begin in the fall of
2005. 4 In May 2005, the parties reached an agreement to arbitrate the
claim in Austria.75 The parties have agreed to accept the decision of a three
person arbitration panel in Austria as final without any right of appeal.76
Although the case did not proceed to trial for final adjudication, the
implications of this case are far-reaching.
II. EXISTING LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF ART LOANS
Many share Professor Michael Bazyler's sentiment that the availability
of U.S. courts to Holocaust victims in their claim for lost artwork is a
"positive development," particularly in light of the fact that it may be the
"last opportunity for the elderly survivors of the Holocaust to have their
grievances heard in a court of law.",77 However, if multijurisdictional art
70 Republic ofAus., 541 U.S. at 677.
71 Id.
72 Joo v. Japan, No., 01-7169, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12755 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 2005);
Abrams v. Socit6 Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 389 F.3d 61, 64-65 (2d Cir.
2004).
73 id.
74 Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2004).
75 Tom Tugend, Artful Solution to Nazi Looting, JEWISH J. OF GREATER L.A., May 27,
2005.
76 Republic of Austria, Maria Altmann Agree to Arbitrate Klimt Paintings Dispute,
BuRRIs & SCHENBERG, LLP (May 18, 2005), at http://www.bslaw.net/news/050518.html.
77 See Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United
States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 8 (2000).
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claims like Altmann continue, it may have an adverse affect on the art
market and, in particular, the loaning and exchanging of art.
Private owners of art are encouraged to loan portions of their
collections to museums and galleries for public viewing. Title claim
disputes, however, can be detrimental to the common practice of loaning
works of art.78 If there is a dispute over title of the artwork, the owner is not
likely to want to lend the artwork in the event a claimant seizes the
opportunity to file a lawsuit while the painting is in a foreign jurisdiction.79
The threat of litigation over Nazi looted artwork can therefore have a
chilling effect on the art loans among various museums and nations.
Even more detrimental to the owner is the possibility of their artwork
being seized in a foreign jurisdiction while on loan in that jurisdiction. The
seizure of artwork can occur through various means: "(1) seizure pending
resolution of an ownership dispute; (2) pre- or post-judgment attachment to
secure satisfaction of a judgment; (3) withholding due to a claim against the
lender or lending government by the museum itself; (4) seizure by the
government due to political controversy; and (5) seizure by customs on
various grounds.,,80 As the number of adverse claims rises, the threat of the
seizure of artwork based on ownership disputes will only worsen.
Congress and various states have had the foresight to institute legal
protections that have up to now permitted organizations and institutions
engaged in nonprofit activities to import, on a temporary basis, works of art
and objects of cultural significance from foreign countries for exhibit and
display, without the risk of the seizure or attachment of the artwork in the
United States. 81
A. Immunity From Seizure Act
82
In response to potential diplomatic conflicts over the seizure of
artwork, Congress enacted the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange
Program of 1961. The relevant language of the Federal Immunity From
Seizure Act ("IFSA") provides that no U.S. or state court "may issue or
enforce any judicial process, or enter any judgment, decree, or order, for the
purpose or having the effect of depriving such institution, or any carrier
engaged in transporting such work or object within the United States, of
custody or control of such object if before the importation of such object the
President or his designee has determined that such object is of cultural
78 Id.
79 Christine Boggis, Going for Gold, BURRIS & SCHENBERG, LLP, at 23 (Dec. 2003/Jan.
2003), at http://www.bslaw.net/news/031222.pdf.
80 Laura Popp, Arresting Art Loan Seizures, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 213, 213-14
(2001).
81 Sarraf, supra note 29, at 729.
82 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2005).
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significance. '" 83  Pursuant to the IFSA, imported artworks and cultural
objects are immune from seizure and other forms of judicial process. 84 The
legislative history suggests that although there were no real opponents to
the enactment of IFSA, there was "some debate in Congress as to whether
[the Act] was necessary at all."85 In the end, Congress approved the IFSA
in 1965 on the basis that the implementation of the IFSA could not cause
any harm.86 In effect, the statute provided lenders assurances that the works
they loan for temporary nonprofit exhibition would not be subject to
attachment or seizure while on display in the United States.87
In order to qualify for the IFSA, certain requirements must be met.
The work must (1) come from a foreign country; (2) the work must be on
temporary exhibit; (3) the loan must be noncommercial; (4) a specific grant
of immunity must be sought and received from the State Department; and
(5) the loan must be of cultural significance and in the national interest. 88 In
the past ten years alone, the State Department has published immunity
notices under the IFSA for more than 600 exhibits. 89
B. State Legislation
Other states and countries have also enacted similar legislation to fill
any gaps in the IFSA's protection.9" In 1968, the state of New York
became the first jurisdiction to implement laws specific to loans of artworks
by nonresidents to cultural institutions, three years after IFSA's
enactment. 91 Unlike the IFSA, a civil lawsuit was the impetus underlying
the enactment of the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law ("ACAL"). 9
83 Id.
84 id.
85 Popp, supra note 80, at 218.




89 Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
90 Texas also enacted legislation to prohibit a court from seizing any work of art "while it
is (1) en route to an exhibition; or (2) in the possession of the exhibitor or on display as part
of the exhibition." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 61.081(a) (2005). However, the
exemption from seizure does not apply if "theft of the work of art from its owner is alleged
and found proven by the court." Id. § 61.081(d); see NORMAN PALMER, ART LOANS 111-12
(1997); Sarraf, supra note 29, at 737. A number of Canadian provinces and France have also
adopted similar anti-seizure statutes to protect temporarily displayed artwork. See Collins,
supra note 23, at 155.
91 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03 (2005).
92 People v. Museum of Modem Art, 93 N.Y.2d 729, 746 (1999). In 1968, a well-known
international artist loaned his artwork to a Buffalo museum for exhibition. His work was
seized under an order of attachment in a lawsuit brought against him by a domestic
corporation.
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The New York legislature promptly responded by enacting a bill that served
to "allay the fears of potential [fine art] exhibitors and enable the State of
New York to maintain its pre-eminent position in the arts."93 Despite the
fact that the protections of the IFSA existed prior to the ACAL, the ACAL
was enacted to provide broader protection than the IFSA. First of all,
immunity under the ACAL is automatic so long as the loan is from a
nonresident and the exhibition is noncommercial. In other words, there is
no special application process and the artwork need not be of "cultural
significance" or in the "national interest" to receive protection. 94
Furthermore, while the IFSA protects against seizures of artwork on loan
from abroad, the ACAL applies to interstate as well as transnational loans.
Lastly, the IFSA grants immunity to the exhibiting museum, while the
ACAL provides immunity to the artwork itself. Together, the statutes
preclude the temporary exhibition of the artwork to serve as a means to
seize it. The implementation of the ACAL by the state of New York
symbolized its desire to further and protect the welfare of the art world and
to reinforce its preeminent place in it.95
For thirty years, both statutes have escaped wide attention from
judicial opinions or legal scholarship. 96 However, in January 1998, the
ACAL for the first time in its history, became the subject of judicial inquiry
over an "Egon Schiele, The Leopold Collection" exhibition that was held at
the Museum of Modem Art ("MoMA") from October 12, 1997 to January
4, 1998. The collection of paintings was on a three-month loan to the
Museum of Modem Art from the Leopold Museum of Austria as part of a
three-year world-wide tour.97 A New York resident claimed ownership of
two of the paintings, "Portrait of Wally" and "Dead Cit III," both loaned
by the Leopold Foundation in Austria for the exhibition. 8 Three days after
the exhibition ended, the New York County District Attorney sought to
exercise subpoena power over the painting pursuant to a grand jury
investigation into the theft of the paintings during the Nazi period. 9
Having allegedly failed to seek IFSA protection over the paintings, the
93 Id.
94 Sarraf, supra note 29, at 737.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 729.
97 Museum of Modern Art, 93 N.Y.2d at 732.
98 United States v. Portrait of Wally, a Painting by Egon Shiele, No. 99 Civ. 9940-MBM,
2002 WL 553532 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002).
99 In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Museum of
Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. 1998), rev'd, 719 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1999) (subpoena
quashed where American citizens claimed ownership of paintings allegedly stolen or
misappropriated by the Nazis from their respective families during the annexation of
Austria).
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MoMA filed a motion to quash based on the ACAL protections. 00 The
"Portrait of Wally" was placed in federal custody until the claims were later
dismissed. The court determined that the subpoena violated the ACAL and
interfered with the lender's possessory interests in the paintings by
compelling their indefinite detention in New York.' 0' Although the judge
acknowledged that the District Attorney had a competing interest to identify
and prosecute criminal activity as "a result of Nazi atrocities," the
legislative intent of the ACAL in prohibiting the seizure of artwork
prevailed.
10 2
Shortly thereafter, New York Governor George Pataki announced his
plan to fight for a change in the ACAL that would permit prosecutors to
seize stolen artwork in criminal investigations.'0 3 The statute was finally
amended on May 24, 2000 to include the word "civil" in two places,
effectively ending the protection ACAL once afforded to loaned artworks
when the seizure was undertaken in connection with a criminal case.
10 4
Therefore, the ACAL now only protects against civil seizures.
While the fine art trade is one of the largest and most lucrative
international industries, the present state of the law regarding stolen art is in
turmoil. The viability and welfare of the art market depends on a high dose
of faith and assurance in the title and ownership interests of the acquisitions
and loaned artworks by museums and individual purchasers. The mere
potential for adverse claims disrupts the art market by putting at risk the
title of thousands of pieces of extremely valuable art, thereby making them
worthless in the public market.'0 5
III. CASES POST-REPUBLIC OFAUSTRIA V. ALTMANN
Although it may be too early to tell what the implications of Altmann
are on Holocaust victims and their claims to recover stolen property, recent
art restitution cases following the Altmann decision have shed some light on
the complex procedural pitfalls that plaintiffs and defendants may continue
to face in litigating these claims.
There has been a significant rise in the number of Nazi-looted art
claims being litigated in U.S. courts and abroad. The declassification of
government documents from the Second World War, along with an increase
100 Popp, supra note 80, at 221.
101 People v. Museum of Modem Art, 93 N.Y.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. 1999).
102 Id. at 742.
103 Barbara Ross & Tracy Tully, Nazi Loot Law May Change, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept.
24, 1999, at 12.
'04 75A N.Y. JUR. 2D, Literary & Artistic Property § 36 (2003).
105 Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation
Between Original Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 DuKE L.J. 955, 1028
(2001).
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in scholarly and journalistic interest in the restitution of Nazi-looted art,
have led to an explosion of claims and restitution efforts. 10 6 These lawsuits
often pit good faith purchasers against original owners and their heirs, and
many times involve the local, national and international art community.1
0 7
As the seizure of the two paintings by Egon Schiele at the Museum of
Modem Art in New York demonstrates, provenance issues will not only
involve private lawsuits between owners and good-faith purchasers but will
strain relations between museums and, possibly, between nations.'
0 8
The cross-border aspect of the art trade also breeds complex
jurisdictional issues. "One difficulty with the study of stolen art stems from
the fact that so much of the stolen art is transported across state and national
boundaries and, as a result, presents difficult questions of international and
domestic choice of law."'1 9 Even after the parties find themselves litigating
in one forum, the resulting judgment may be difficult to enforce if the
present location of the artwork is not in the same jurisdiction rendering the
judgment. " 0
Disputes over Nazi-looted artwork have generated discussion and
debate amongst legislators, courts and the international art community
ranging from granting immunity to determining the proper statute of
limitations for stolen or looted works of art. The assortment of
jurisdictional discrepancies, such as differing statute of limitations periods,
can lead to incongruent outcomes and ultimately cause instability in the art
market.
A. FSIA v. IFSA: Malewicz v. City ofAmsterdam l '
In the recent case of Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, immunity under
IFSA did not prevent subject matter jurisdiction over a painting that was
held by an Amsterdam museum. 1 2 Heirs of Kazimir Malewicz, a Russian
avant-garde artist, sued the city of Amsterdam in an attempt to recover
fourteen artworks, valued at $150 million, that they claimed were rightfully
theirs. 1 3 The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court in the District of
106 Minkovich, supra note 2, at 353; see David Wissbroecker, Six Klimts, a Picasso & A
Schiele: Recent Litigation Attempts to Recover Nazi Stolen Art, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART &
Er. L. 39 (2004).
107 Collins, supra note 23, at 119.
108 See, e.g., Reyhan, supra note 105, at 959.
109 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 102-03.
110 Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the International
Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 239,
239-40 (2004).
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Columbia in January of 2004.114 The paintings were the subject of an
exhibition last year at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New York
and the Menil Collection in Houston. Lisa Dennison, deputy director of the
Guggenheim, said that at the time of the show the museum had received
immunity from seizure from the U.S. government. 1" 5 The plaintiffs claim
that the 14 artworks were a part of a larger group of more than 100 works
that Kazimir Malewicz took to Berlin in 1927 for display at the Great Berlin
Art Exhibition.' 16 The court found that the heirs satisfied the "present in
U.S." factor of FSIA by filing a complaint while the works were on loan to
museums in the United States even though the painting had long left the
country by the time the complaint was served.' 17
Although Judge Rosemary M. Collyer acknowledged that even though
a court order to return the works to the Malewicz heirs would only be "as
valuable as their ability to persuade a Dutch court to enforce it," it should
not preclude the U.S. court from litigating the issue. 'I1 Judge Collyer noted
that the "presence or absence of the property makes no difference during the
litigation" process." 9 The court found that even "happenstantial presence"
of these artworks in display at a U.S. museum fulfills the requirement for
jurisdiction. 120
Another interesting issue decided by the court was the court's
determination of whether the City of Amsterdam had engaged in
"commercial activity carried on in the United States."'' l The court relied
on Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. to determine the commercial
character of the loan. The standard used by the court was whether the
particular actions that the foreign government performed were similar to the
types of activity engaged in by a private party for "trade and traffic or
commerce."' 122 Under this reasoning, the court in Malewicz found that
loaning artwork to museums in the United States constitutes typical
"commercial activities" engaged in by private parties.123
Although not explicitly discussed in the opinion, classifying the art
loan as commercial activity under the FSIA, by its definition, would
preclude immunity from seizure under the IFSA. The IFSA is clear in
114 Id.
115 Carol Vogel, Artist's Heirs Sue Amsterdam Over 14 Works, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004,
at E3.
116 Id.
117 Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 311-12.
118 id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 311.
121 Id. at 313.
122 Id. (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992)).
123 Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 313-14.
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limiting immunity to art loans within the United States that are
"administered, operated, or sponsored without profit." 124  It is not clear
what the threshold of commercial activity is in order to determine when the
art loan loses its protection. 125 Art loans undoubtedly have the earmarks of
commercial acts because their very nature consists of lending property in
exchange for compensation. 26 Furthermore, the widespread occurrence of
"blockbuster" exhibitions frequently involve the sale of admission tickets
and memorabilia that also may profit the lender.127 As for now, the State
Department has not strictly construed the "non-commercial" criterion of the
IFSA, but it may be problematic in the future if art loans lose their non-
commercial nature and along with it, their protection from seizures. 
128
In the future, however, without a firm pronouncement from the U.S.
Supreme Court or Congress of the priority of the FSIA over the IFSA or
vice versa, foreign lenders are at the mercy of the particular court's
interpretation of these statutes. Presently, the requirements of the IFSA do
not adequately protect the interest of a foreign lender against seizure or
from being subject to litigation in the United States. The vast number of art
institutions, private holders and individuals who lend works of art for
nonprofit display, assert that a "firm guarantee against judicial seizure is an
'essential factor' in [their] decision to lend" artwork to foreign countries.1 29
As the United States correctly pointed out in Malewicz, "[t]he possibility
that such a minimal level of contact will necessarily suffice to provide
jurisdiction threatens to chill" the international art exchange program. 130
The loaning of artwork provides educational and historic value to the
recipient museum and nation. Thus, notwithstanding the commercial nature
of art loans, clarification is needed on the scope of immunity available
under the IFSA in light of the Malewicz and Altmann decisions. The
regulation of the art industry needs to balance the public's interest in the
protection of the loaned artwork with the industry's legitimate interest in
124 Federal Immunity From Seizure Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2459(a) (2000).
125 Zerbe, supra note 54, at 1140.
126 Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 (2005). The Act provides that
"[a] 'commercial activity' means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose."
127 A 1998 Monet exhibit at the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston resulted in over $2
million in gift item sales. Joy Hakanson Colby, Van Gogh Exhibit Could Set DIA Sales
Records, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 18, 2000, at Al. The Monet show had secured an IFSA grant
of immunity for its stay in the United States. Brian MacQuarrie & Walter V. Robinson, MFA
Moves to Verify that Monet Was Looted, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1998, at Al.
128 Zerbe, supra note 54, at 1140.
129 Sarraf, supra note 29, at 740; see also Anglim, supra note 110, at 300.
130 Anglim, supra note 110, at 312.
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resolving claims of Nazi-looted art.'
31
The Malewicz case, however, is far from over. Although the City of
Amsterdam's motion to dismiss was denied, the court left open the
possibility of deferring to the Dutch courts if the courts in the Netherlands
waive the statute of limitations defense, which is also one of the reasons for
plaintiffs choice of venue in the United States. 132 Of keen importance here
is the potential for lenders of artwork to be subject to litigation in the
United States despite the presence of a federal immunity statute. Although
under the statute, the Malewicz heirs could not seek to seize the artwork
while it was in this country under a grant of IFSA, they were able to use
"the window of opportunity afforded by the Malewicz exhibition[s] as the
jurisdictional hook for their claims."' 33  While a loan from a foreign
sovereign received additional protection from the FSIA by restricting
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns to in personam, as
opposed to strictly in rem or quasi in rem, Malewicz now permits in rem
jurisdiction in the United States for the temporary display of artwork, while
on loan to a U.S. museum. 134 For heirs of stolen artwork, the Malewicz
decision, along with Altmann, opens up the door for claimants to bring their
suit in the United States even if in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction is not
available. A short term presence of an artwork during an exhibition in the
United States or even a foreign sovereign's publication or advertisement of
the artwork-related merchandise for sale in the United States can suffice.
B. No Uniformity of Protection for International and Domestic Exhibitions:
Alsdorf v. Bennigson135
Lenders of artwork should not only be concerned with the potential for
seizure of artwork on loan to other museums in foreign countries, but also
in any domestic exhibition of their artwork. The IFSA currently only
protects loans from foreign countries; however, not all states have their own
individual statutes prohibiting seizures when artwork comes into their
jurisdiction. While the IFSA is limited to international loans, the majority
of loans to museums in the United States are interstate and are not all
subject to protection. 136  Therefore, the happenstantial presence of an
artwork in an unfavorable jurisdiction can mean jeopardizing possession
and ultimate title to the artwork.
In the case of United States v. One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En
13l Predita Rostomian, Comment, Looted Art in the U.S. Market, 55 RUTGERS L. REv.
271, 295 (2002).
132 id.
133 Id. at 310.
134 Zerbe, supra note 54, at 1130.
135 Alsdorfv. Bennigson, No. 04-C5953, 2004 WL 2806301 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
136 Popp, supra note at 80, at 218.
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Blanc, 137 the U.S. government filed a forfeiture action against Alsdorfs
painting, the "Femme en Blanc," on October 6, 2004.1 "Femme en
Blanc," valued at over $10 million, is a portrait from Picasso's classic
period after World War I that depicts a contemplative woman wearing a
white gown.1 39 Under seizure, the government permitted the painting to
remain in Alsdorfs possession until the courts could resolve the legal
ownership dispute. 140 Multiple cases were filed in state and federal courts
that included the plaintiff, defendant, art dealer, gallery owner and the U.S.
government as parties to the claim.
14 1
The painting originally belonged to art collectors Robert and Carlota
Landsberg, who bought the painting in the mid-i 920s. 142 In anticipation of
Hitler's regime, they sent the painting for safekeeping to a Parisian art
dealer, Justin Thannhauser, from whom the Nazis stole the painting in
1940.14' After the Second World War, Mrs. Landsberg searched for the
painting to no avail. In 1947, the painting was included, with a small photo,
in an inventory of looted paintings compiled by the Allied forces. 14  The
painting subsequently changed hands among art dealers and was last
purchased by a New York art dealer in Paris in 1975. That same year, he
sold the piece to Chicago resident Marilynn Alsdorf and her late husband,
James, for $357,000.145
In 2001, Alsdorf began circulating the painting for exhibition and
possible sale. 146 Alsdorf first allowed the painting to be displayed at a
gallery in Los Angeles for about a month in the fall of 2001. 47 In early
2002, Alsdorf also shipped the painting from Chicago to Geneva, where a
potential buyer was to view the painting.148 As part of his due diligence, the
buyer contacted the Art Loss Register ("ALR"), an international
clearinghouse of historical information concerning Nazi-looted art to
137 United States v. One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En Blanc" by Pablo Picasso, 362
F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
138 Howard Reich, U.S. Acts to Protect a Picasso, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 27, 2004, at 1.
139 Reich, supra note 138, at 1.
140 Id.
141 Alsdorfv. Bennigson, No. 04-C5953, 2004 WL 2806301, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
142 Press Release, FBI Los ANGELES FIELD OFFICE, $10 Million Picasso Painting Stolen
by Nazis During World War II Seized by U.S. (Oct. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pr2004/135a.html.
14' Alsdorf, 2004 WL 2806301, at *2; One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En Blanc, " 362
F. Supp. 2dat 1178.
144 One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En Blanc, " 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
145 Id.
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investigate the provenance of the painting. 149 Meanwhile, another potential
buyer's interest in the painting prompted the transfer of the painting back to
Los Angeles while the ALR investigation continued. On May 2, 2002, the
ALR informed Alsdorf that the painting had been looted by the Nazis from
its Jewish owner during the Second World War. 50 In June 2002, the ALR
located Mrs. Landsberg's sole heir, claimant Thomas C. Bennigson, her
grandson, in Berkeley, California.
51
Bennigson initially attempted to settle his claims with Alsdorf, but
those settlement negotiations were unsuccessful. 152 On December 13, 2002,
Alsdorf instructed the gallery owner to arrange for the transport of the
painting from Los Angeles back to Chicago. Six days later, unaware of
Alsdorfs plans to send the painting back to Chicago, Bennigson filed suit
in the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles against
Alsdorf seeking replevin, injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order
to keep the painting in Los Angeles. 53  Hours before the temporary
restraining order hearing was scheduled to begin, the painting left Los
Angeles for Chicago.'
54
On June 16, 2003, the California Superior Court granted Alsdorf's
motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction over Alsdorf, who was a
resident of Illinois. 155 Bennigson appealed the grant of Alsdorf's motion;
however, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's
decision.' 56 The California Supreme Court subsequently accepted the case
for review on July 28, 2004.'1 On September 10, 2004, Alsdorf began a
separate federal lawsuit in Chicago, seeking a declaration of good title to
the painting. She alleged that she acquired valid title from a dealer who had
a superior right of ownership against all others under French law.1 58 She
argued that French law governed her purchase because her dealer, Stephen
Hahn, bought the painting in Paris. 159 The district court judge issued a
temporary stay pending the resolution of Bennigson's appeal before the
California Supreme Court.
60
In a strange turn of events, with the case pending review by the
'4 One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En Blanc, " 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
15o Lufkin, supra note 138.
151 One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En Blanc, " 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
152 Alsdorf, 2004 WL 2806301, at *3.
153 Id.
154 Id.
"' One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En Blanc, " 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
156 Bennigson v. Alsdorf, No. BC 287294, 2004 WL 803616 (Cal. 2004).
157 Tina Spee, State Justices Agree to Review Case of Picasso Stolen by Nazis, L.A.
DAILY J., July 29, 2004.
158 Lufkin, supra note 138; Alsdorf, 2004 WL 2806301, at *8.
"' Alsdorf, 2004 WL 2806301, at *8.
160 Alsdorf 2004 WL 2806301, at *10-11; Spee, supra note 157.
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California Supreme Court and a temporary stay issued in a district court in
Illinois, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles filed a complaint for
civil forfeiture in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on October 6, 2004. The U.S. government alleged that Alsdorf
knowingly transported stolen property in interstate commerce. 16 1 The move
by federal prosecutors was the first time the U.S. government had invoked
the National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA") against an individual collector
in an attempt to seize Nazi-looted art on the theory that the property was a
stolen good which crossed state lines.
162
On December 13, 2004, Alsdorf brought a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, or alternatively, to transfer the case to the
Northern District of Illinois. 63 U.S. District Judge Florence-Marie Cooper
denied her motion and stated that even though Alsdorf filed the Illinois
action one month before the Government brought its forfeiture action, the
Illinois court had yet to assert jurisdiction over the painting, whereas the
seizure by the U.S. marshal under process issued by the California district
court established the jurisdiction of that court. 164 Furthermore, the Illinois
court had neither ordered a stay in the Illinois action nor made any attempts
to seize the painting or deposit the painting with the court.
165
The California district court reaffirmed the view that the filing of a
complaint alone does not provide in rem jurisdiction in that particular court
to the exclusion of other courts. The court abided by a three-part test to
determine whether the court could exercise specific personal jurisdiction,
weighing the issues of purposeful availment, relatedness of claims, and
reasonableness. 166 First of all, the requirement of purposeful availment
ensures that a defendant will not be hauled into a jurisdiction solely as a
result of "random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral
activity of another party or third person. 167 The court determined that Mrs.
Aldorfs contacts in California were not "random, fortuitous or attenuated"
because she chose the particular art dealer in California and made an
agreement with the dealer to exhibit and later sell her painting.168 It is also
undisputed that she authorized her painting to be displayed and held in
California for eight months. 69 The court found that these actions were not
161 Reich, supra note 138, at 1.
162 Lufkin, supra note 138.
163 One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En Blanc, " 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
164 Kenneth Ofgang, Judge Declines to Toss Suit Over Painting Allegedly Stolen by
Nazis, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Apr. 4, 2005), at http://www.metnews.com/
articles/2005/benn040405.htm.
165 One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En Blanc, "362 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.
166 Id. at 1187 (citing Roth v. Marquez, 942 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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fortuitous or attenuated to prohibit jurisdiction.
Secondly, the district court also established that Alsdorf's "claim of
ownership gave rise to and is related to Bennigson's replevin and [larceny]
claims" of Alsdorf s retention and removal of the painting from California
after she was aware that her ownership was in dispute. 170 Lastly, the court
also established that the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable and the
burden was "no greater than what any litigant faces in a foreign forum.''
The court acknowledged that California had an expressed interest in
protecting its resident's ownership interests in artwork stolen by the Nazis
as evidenced by its enactment of Section 354 of the California Civil
Procedures, which extends the statute of limitations to file claims against
museums and galleries until 2010.172 Illinois, on the other hand, lacks a
clear statute of limitations for such cases. 173  The California Court of
Appeal previously ruled that Alsdorf, an individual art collector, was not
one of the specific "entities" against whom the state chose to extend the
statute of limitations. Nevertheless, the district court stated that it did not
"lessen California's interest in the subject matter of the suit" and thus,
permitted the suit to continue.
174
While maintaining that the painting had been purchased in good faith
with proper legal title, Marilynn Alsdorf agreed to a $6.5 million settlement
citing her advanced age and the need to resolve financial claims to facilitate
the completion of her commitments to her family and charitable
organizations. The parties consented to granting Mrs. Alsdorf incontestable
title to the painting.'75 Bennigson would also receive the-Profit that the
New York art dealer Hahn had realized on the initial sale. 76 In addition,
Los Angeles art dealer David Tunkl agreed to pay an undisclosed
percentage of his commission to Bennigson if Alsdorf sold the painting
within the next three years.'77
170 Id. at 1188.
7 One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En Blanc, "362 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3 (West 2004) (extending the statute of
limitations for filing suit against galleries and museums).
173 Id.; see also Spee, supra note 157, at 1.
174 Compare Bennigson, 2004 WL 803616, with One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme En
Blanc," 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.
175 Howard Reich, $6.5 Million Will End Picasso Fight, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 10,
2005, at 16.
176 Diane Haithman, Deal Reached for Art with Nazi Ties, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 2005, at
3; see Blair Clarkson, Judge OKs Pursuit of Stolen Art, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 21, 2005, at 2
(settlement made after a Santa Barbara Superior Court judge ruled on Jan. 20, 2005 that
under the state's three-year statute of limitations for detained goods, Bennigson can sue the
New York art dealer who sold the Picasso under a constructive trust theory). The judge
permitted a "constructive trust" on the sale proceeds as a remedy when a person earns
compensation from the sale of property belonging to another. Id.
177 Kenneth Ofgang, Dispute Over Painting Allegedly Stolen by Nazis Settled,
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In this case, neither California nor Illinois had statutes in place to
protect against the government's seizure of the artwork. Thus, lenders or
even good faith purchasers who circulate their artwork for possible sale
may be susceptible to potential seizure of artwork. As a result, there are not
only discrepancies in the protections granted to foreign and domestic loans,
but also discrepancies within the different states. As a result, the interstate
movement of art can have severe repercussions for the owner.
C. Inconsistent Application of the Statute of Limitations: Adler v. Taylor
Around the same time as the Bennigson litigation, the California
district court also ruled on another case involving Nazi-looted art. At issue
in this case was a Van Gogh painting held by Elizabeth Taylor, who bought
the painting at an auction in England in 1963. The heirs and descendants of
an art collector who owned the painting before it was stolen by the Nazis
brought this claim against Ms. Taylor. In this case, the court held that
Section 354.3 of the California Civil Procedure, which extends the statute
of limitations until 2010 for galleries and museums, did not apply because
the purchaser of the painting, which had been taken from the heirs' relative
by the Nazis, was an individual, not a gallery or a museum. 178 Whereas, the
court in Alsdorf v. Bennigson was willing to extend the statute of limitations
period for public policy reasons, the court in Adler v. Taylor strictly
construed the relevant statutory provisions.
Furthermore, the Adler court declined to apply the discovery rule as set
forth in Section 338(c) of the California Civil Procedure because Taylor
bought the painting in 1963, well before the statute was enacted. 179 Under
the old rule, the statute of limitations ran against the good faith purchaser of
stolen property at the time he or she acquired the property. Accordingly,
the statute of limitations would have expired in 1963.0 The judge
reasoned that even if the discovery rule was applied in this case, the claim
METROPOLITAN NEWS, (Aug. 10, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.metnews.com/articles/
2005/benn081005.htm.
178 The California Civil Procedure Code provides:
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any owner, or heir or beneficiary of an
owner, or Holocaust-era artwork, may bring an action to recover Holocaust-era artwork from
any entity...
(c) Any action brought under this section shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with
the applicable statute of limitation, if the action is commenced on or before December 31,
2010.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3 (West 2005) ("Entity" is defined in § 354.3(a)(1) as:
"Any museum or gallery that displays, exhibits, or sells any article of historical, interpretive,
scientific, or artistic significance.")
179 Adler v. Taylor, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5862, at *11 (C.D.Cal. 2005).
s0 Id. at 12.
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would be barred because plaintiffs "by exercise of reasonable diligence,"
should have discovered the painting's whereabouts given Ms. Taylor's
notoriety.1 l Thus, the same district court entered divergent views on the
proper application of statute of limitations for Nazi-looted art.
D. Art Dealers and Galleries are Susceptible to Liability
Another case involving litigation against a Spanish museum is also
pending in the California district court. The case involves a painting by
impressionist Camille Pissarro, currently in Madrid's Thyssen-Bornemisza
Museum.18 2 The 1897 Pissarro known as "Rue de Saint honor Apr~s Midi,
Effect de Pluie," originally belonged to claimant Claude Cassirer's
grandmother, Lilly Neubauer-Cassirer. Neubauer-Cassirer's father had
purchased the painting from an art dealer in 1900. Fleeing Germany in the
face of the Nazi invasion, Neubauer-Cassirer was forced to give up the
artwork to a German art dealer. The painting passed through several
dealers' hands before being seized by the Nazis in Holland and sold to an
anonymous buyer in 1943. After the war ended, the German government
voided the initial sales transaction under restitution laws and declared
Neubauer-Cassirer the legal owner of the painting. The painting, however,
was never found. Cassirer only recently learned of the painting's location
after seeing it in a catalogue of the Thyssen collection.18 3 On the other
hand, the museum claims that the late Baron Hans Heinrich Thyssen-
Bornemisza bought the painting in 1975 from a New York gallery and from
the same dealer that allegedly sold Mrs. Alsdorf the Picasso painting.
184
The case has caused great interest in the legal and art worlds because
of a Superior Court ruling that an art dealer or gallery owner can be sued for
the proceeds he gained by selling Nazi-looted paintings. In her ruling,
Superior Court Judge Denise deBellefeuille found that the use of a
"constructive trust" on the sale proceeds of the two paintings was a proper
remedy when a person earns compensation from the sale of property
belonging to another. This appears to be the first time that someone has
tried to sue downstream to recover the profit earned from a dealer who sold
Nazi-looted paintings. 185 Litigation of these claims have brought about
unanticipated results and resolutions by the courts. However, how these
181 Id. at 13.
182 Tom Tugend, In Two Cases, Families of Victims Ask Court for Return of Nazi-looted
Art, GLOBAL NEWS SERV. OF JEWISH PEOPLE (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.jta.org/
page-printstory. asp?intarticleid= 15023.
183 Blair Clarkson, Judge OKs Pursuit of Stolen Art, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 21, 2005, at 2.
184 Mar Roman, Thyssen Museum Says it is Legal Owner of Alleged Nazi-looted
Masterpiece, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 11, 2003), available at http://www.museum-
security.org/03/020.html.
185 Tugend, supra note 182.
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decisions will affect the various participants in the art market, including art
dealers and galleries is still unclear.
IV. PROPOPOSED RULES
As one author notes, the Altmann case seems to reflect the Court's
sentiment to "effect legislative change and stretch the limits of legal
interpretation to create an environment that provides substantially greater
opportunities to recover the works of art taken from their families during
the Nazi occupation."' 8 6  As has been noted, "[s]ince the Holocaust
restitution campaign began in the mid-1990s, more than two thousand
works of art have been returned to their rightful owners worldwide without
litigation." 187  While international treaties have tried to create harmony
going forward, many claims have gone unanswered and have left the
claimants no choice but to resort to the judicial system for remedies. Many
cases, however, have shown that art restitution claims do not have to be
winner-take-all propositions, which produce prolonged struggles in the
courts, often times draining the resources of the parties involved. In a
gesture of good will, many parties have voluntarily settled their claims.
88
These parties have found that the legal system's inconsistent and
unpredictable resolutions often fail to adeuately protect their rights in
seeking or retain ownership of their artwork. p
Given the diversity of standards under U.S. state law, where the art is
found or loaned will usually determine the standard of proof, the statute of
limitations and any rights available to the original owners or the goof faith
purchasers. As we have seen, Nazi-looted art cases often turn on the sheer
happenstance of where the art has come to rest, with certain jurisdictions
completely precluding recovery. To the extent that a private or public
owner desires to avoid that uncertainty, the art "stays put" to the detriment
of the broader public audience. 190 The uncertainty of title therefore will
frighten owners into keep these treasures safely in their possession, thereby
effectively losing these pieces a second time for the world to enjoy. 191 This
186 Wissbroecker, supra note 106, at 71.
187 Michael J. Bazyler and Kearston G. Everitt, Holocaust Restitution Litigation in the
United States: An Update, International Civil Liberties Report, 2004 ACLU INT'L CIv.
LIBERTIES REP., Dec. 10, 2004, at 11, available at http://www.aclu.org/iclr/bazyler.pdf (last
visited Nov. 6, 2005).
188 Karin Hanta, Looted Art: A Morality Tale, 9 Aus. KULTUR 1 (1999), available at
http://www.adele.at/Press%20Clippings%20Zusammenfassung%2Presse/Press- Clippings-
1 999_English/Article-byKarinHanta_/article-january_ 1999_austriak.html.
189 Owen C. Pell, 1999 Symposium Theft ofArt During World War II: The Potential for a
Mediation/Arbitration Commission to Resolve Disputes Relating to Artworks Stolen or
Looted During World War I, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. & POL'Y 27, 44 (1999).
190 Reyhan, supra note 105, at 1028.
191 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 101-02.
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would make the discovery of these artworks by the original owners even
more difficult and the resolution of adverse claims nearly impossible.
This seems particularly unfair to victims of genocide or their heirs
who, of course, had no control over the disposition or movement of their
artworks. The Altmann case brings the world's attention to the need for a
prompt and uniform rule of law to address claims of Nazi-looted art.'
92
Countries should establish means by which claimants and purchasers, both
victimized by this situation, can deal with the complex multi-jurisdictional
issues raised by looted art cases without resorting to a seemingly adversarial
and unpredictable forum.
The unique circumstances of the Holocaust necessitate a change in
legal rules and an implementation of special considerations given to
Holocaust victims and their heirs to recover their stolen works of art. 93 A
lack of consensus and even opposition by international legislative bodies
and courts have hindered the adoption of uniform resolution mechanisms to
deal with the current problem.' 94 In light of this current resistance, rule-
making should begin in the individual legislature, which is best suited to
address the delicate balance between the competing interests of both the
good faith purchasers and the unfortunate victims of the Second World
War.' 95 Although the U.S. courts have done much to provide redress to
certain Holocaust victims, the resolution needs to be equally applied and
implemented. The U.S. legislature should adopt specific rules with regard
to determining proper title, setting proper statute of limitations periods, and
providing adequate reparation to the good faith purchaser in the event he or
she returns the painting to the original owner.196 Only with these specific
resolution mechanisms will prompt and consistent decisions arise.
A. Title Registration
The U.S. government should adopt a title registration system that
encourages the flow of information between buyers, sellers, and lenders of
artwork. In any unregulated market, sellers have an incentive to conceal
information to the buyer. For example, "each participant in the illicit
antiquities market has an incentive to strip as much information as possible
from an artifact before it enters the safe anonymity of the legitimate art
192 Maples, supra note 1, at 369.
193 Patty Gerstenblith, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Indigenous
Culture: Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and the Fiduciary
Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 409, 444 (2003).
194 Teresa Giovannini, The Holocaust and Looted Art, 7 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 263, 279
(2002).
195 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 112.
196 Giovannini, supra note 194.
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market." 197 Thus, sellers are apt to conceal information rather than be
forthcoming about the artwork's provenance. This unfortunate
circumstance results in artwork that offers no guarantee of valid title to the
potential owner and more tragically, in artwork that is often "divorced from
its cultural roots."1 98 When there are certain types of market deficiencies,
an economic theory supports the need for government intervention.
The solution to this problem is a title registration system with legal
effect. "For a competitive market to function well, buyers must have
sufficient information to evaluate competing products." 199  Disclosure
through a title registration system that has binding legal effect is critical to
the creation of a viable art market; it provides "an obvious remedy to
problems of inadequate information" when the art market is unable to
provide all of the information a purchaser of the artwork would be willing
to pay for.200 The proposed system would provide a uniform method for the
disclosure and dissemination of information regarding title to the buyer and
seller of the artwork.20 ' As organizations like the ALR become more
widespread, additional inquiries into the provenance of the artworks should
be statutorily required. Only then will title be valid and art circulate more
freely.
B. Discovery Rule
Currently, the United States operates under a due diligence standard.202
Under this standard, the statute of limitations begins to run when the
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the location of the artwork and
the identity of the possessor from reasonable due diligence.20 3 Several
jurisdictions have modified their rules concerning the accrual of claims so
that the statutory period does not begin to run until the original owner
discovers the work's location or the identity of its possessor (the Discovery
Rule) or until the original owner demands return of the work and is refused
(the Demand and Refusal Rule). California currently employs the
Discovery Rule pursuant to Section 338(3) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that an action must be brought within three years
of "the discovery of the whereabouts" of the work by the aggrieved party.
This rule applies even in the case of an innocent third-party purchaser of
197 Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal
Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 410 (1995).
198 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORMS 26 (1982).
199 Pell, supra note 189, at 51.
200 Id. at 52.
201 Id. at 53.
202 Rebecca L. Garrett, Time for a Change? Restoring Nazi-Looted Artwork to its Rightful
Owners, 12 PACE INr'L L. REv. 367, 375 (2000).
203 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
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stolen property.2°4 This means that an original owner may still not be time-
barred from bringing suit, so long as the action is brought within three years
of his discovery of the artwork or the possessor.20 5 Thus, the original owner
may often times end up bringing a claim decades after the date of the
appropriation.
According to the Demand and Refusal Rule in New York, the statute
of limitations does not start to run until the original owner makes a demand
upon the current good faith possessor for return of the stolen property and
the current possessor refuses. 206  This rule necessitates that the original
owner ascertain where the property is located, who the identity of the
current possessor is, and make an affirmative demand before the statutory
time period starts, thus giving the owner ample opportunity to find the
property.20 7 At the same time, New York courts permit the equitable
defense of laches, which will bar plaintiffs claims if the plaintiff has
unreasonably delayed bringing suit and thereby prejudices the defendant.20 8
Because of the great length of time and huge potential for inequitable
treatment of these possessors, the United States should modify the
Discovery Rule such that it will "encourage public display of the works
while giving victims adequate notice of their potential claims" to bring
about efficient settlements of claims."20 9  The rationale behind the
Discovery Rule is that plaintiffs must proactively search for the artwork and
defendants must not only show that they purchased the artwork in good
faith, but must also make their possession known to the general public.
2 10
To clarify, the revised discovery rule should only apply to good faith
purchasers. Thus, this rule will allow the good faith purchaser to recognize
full title over the artwork only after certain due diligence requirements have
been met.211 First of all, the good faith purchaser must register title to their
artwork, thus providing ample opportunity for the original owner to locate
the artwork's whereabouts. By requiring the good faith purchaser to
register the artwork, the good faith purchaser will be required to learn of the
artwork's provenance and will prevent the type of "willful blindness"
typically relied on by purchasers of fine art who acquired these pieces in an
age when much less investigation and research was feasible. Thus, it serves
two purposes in incentivizing the good faith purchaser to make reasonable
204 Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784 (1996).
205 Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the Museum: A
Proposed Solution to Disputes over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 15, 20 (1998).
206 See Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
207 See Republic of Turkey v. Metro. Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
208 Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430-31 (N.Y. 1991).
209 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 122.
210 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870, 872 (N.J. 1980).
211 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 113.
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efforts to investigate the provenance of his or her artwork and in putting the
"would-be claimant on notice" of the purchaser's possession of the
artwork.212
Secondly, the new discovery rule would require that the good faith
purchaser's possession be "notorious," meaning that a would-be claimant
would be able to gather some idea of its location and the identity of the
possessor through reasonable due diligence, aside from just the title
registration alone. This rule encourages good faith purchasers to publicly
display their pieces, as opposed to the demand and refusal rule, which
prompts possessors of illicit artwork to hide the artwork until sufficient time
has lapsed. Public display of the artwork not only serves to put the claimant
on notice, but is sufficient to start the statute of limitations period.21 3
This rule also would also encourage the exchange of artwork to
museum and other non-profit entities. Public display of the artwork in
museums or publications of the artwork in catalogues will only strengthen
the possessor's argument that his or her possession was "notorious" and
precludes lenders from removing a work from exhibition when the
artwork's title is contested.21 4 Moreover, "the benefit enjoyed by the public
museums and exhibiting collectors will also accrue to the public as more
pieces, especially never before seen works, are publicly exhibited. 2 1
5
Loans have dual benefits for the owner as well, since the artwork's value
and sale price can increase when the artwork is placed on loan.216 Although
the federal government indemnifies museums for works brought to the
United States from foreign countries, indemnification for domestic loans
and traveling exhibitions should also be put into place.217
The existence of immunity statutes like the IFSA and ACAL are
critical because permitting seizures would be "counter-productive to the
open display of works of art that is so critical for learning about where
works of art are located for potential claimants.21 8 Opponents to anti-
seizure laws argue that the inability to seize artwork while on loan will
impede restitution attempts by potential claimants.2 '9 As evidenced by
Malewicz, the IFSA does not bar U.S. courts from gaining jurisdiction over
the artwork. For the time being, under the discovery rule, to encourage the
212Id. at 115.
213 See O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 868.
214 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 116.
215 Id. at 118-19.
216 Nicole Wilkes, Public Responsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property:
Toward a National Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 203
(2001).217 Id. at 204.
218 Popp, supra note 80, at 227.
219 Id. at 228.
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exhibition and display of artwork, protection over interstate or domestic
loans should be added to the IFSA.22  With the threat of seizure of artwork
minimized, parties may be willing to negotiate a mutually beneficial
settlement.
C. Statute of Limitations
The U.S. government should adopt a limited statute of limitations for a
good faith purchaser who follows the requirements under the Discovery
Rule. Many countries have considered their own legislative change in
terms of extending or removing statutory limitations periods or annulling
later acquired titles.22' For example, France allows a three-year statute of
limitations period, while Switzerland permits five years for a claim for
restitution to be filed.222 Germany, on the other hand, provides for a 30-
year limitation period, which runs anew each time the artwork changes
ownership.223 However, other countries like England provide that time will
not run in favor of a thief or a person who acquires property through a thief.
A good faith purchase, however, will allow for a six-year limitation
period.224
The United States should create similar statute of limitation
adjustments to address the need for restitution of artwork that has been
displaced by the Nazis. While a thief or one who receives possession of
stolen property from a thief can never gain title in the United States, a
Holocaust victim's claims for recovery of the artworks are often subject to
the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. In most states, the
statute of limitations for the recovery of stolen personal property is at the
longest, six years, thus barring most of these claims.225
Some legal commentators advocate the suspension of the statute of
220 Id. at 231.
221 The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly expressly provides that "it may be
necessary to facilitate restitution by providing for legislative change with particular regard
being paid to... extending or removing statutory limitations periods." Commission
Resolution 1205 on Looted Jewish Cultural Property of the Council of Europe, Res. 1205,
Looted Jewish Cultural Property, EuR. PARL. Ass., Doc. No. 8563 (Nov. 4, 1999). Good
faith is generally presumed and the law in civil law countries protects the good faith
possessor's title. Resolution No. 1205 of the Council of Europe indirectly recommends the
cancellation of the good faith owner's title in providing that consideration should also be
given to "annulling later acquired titles, that is, subsequent to the divestment." See also
Giovannini, supra note 194.
222 Giovannini, supra note 194; see also Code Civil Suisse [Cc], art. 934 (Switz.).
223 Giovannini, supra note 194; see also Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] Art. 195.
224 Giovannini, supra note 194; see also Limitations Act, 1980, §§ 3-4 (Eng.).
225 See Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF L.
REV. 119, 121-22 & n.10 (1988).
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limitations in all cases involving recovery of Holocaust-looted art works. 6
In most cases, the original owners are not able to locate the stolen artwork
until the statue of limitations has run on their claim for recovery of their
artwork. Thus, the statute of limitations historically serves as their primary
defense against liability for replevin of stolen artwork.227
The primary purpose of a statute limitations period, however, is
fairness to the defendant. A defendant should reasonably expect that "the
slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be
called on to resist a claim where the 'evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.', 22 8 Furthermore, the burden on the
courts to adjudicate stale and groundless claims is another public policy
argument for having a limitations period.2 29  Eventually, statute of
limitations and other policy concerns for balancing the equities inherent in a
laches defense will grow over the course of time. Currently, claimants in
these cases are Holocaust survivors, their children, or their grandchildren.
The defendants are frequently the initial good-faith purchasers who
purchased the artworks shortly after the war. "As both parties become more
remotely connected to the original parties to the dispute (both the actual
theft victim and the Nazis or the thief), the policy of reuniting Holocaust
victims with their stolen property becomes weaker and the interest in
quieting title becomes stronger., 230 Courts may find the policy of returning
property stolen by the Nazis to its original owners less compelling when the
claimant is several generations removed from the original owner. The
argument that good-faith purchasers who currently possess the artwork are
just as entitled to the artwork than the original owner's distant relatives
becomes more plausible. While this scenario has not yet come to be the
case, the argument for it will become more persuasive over the next few
decades. In the meantime, Congressional action is needed to remove the
bar on claims for restitution based on divergent statute of limitations
provisions.
The implementation and adoption of a limited statute of limitations
period, for example, five years may "quiet title in museums and private
collectors that display work publicly, provided that they purchased the work
in good faith.",23  The public policy objective for having a statute of
limitations also promotes the free trade of goods, ensuring that "those who
have dealt with the property in good faith can enjoy secure and peaceful
226 See, e.g., Cuba, supra note 25, at 480-89.
227 Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen Artwork: Deciding Ownership Is No Pretty
Picture, 43 DuKE L.J. 337, 340 (1993).
228 Duffy v. Horton Mem'l Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 820, 893 (N.Y. 1985).
229 id.
230 Minkovich, supra note 2, at 381.
231 Schlegelmilch, supra note 4, at 115.
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possession after a certain, specified time period has passed. ' 232  In
conjunction with the Discovery Rule, it will allow claimants and original
owners to discover the whereabouts of the artwork and at the same time
prevent them from sitting on their claim in order to toll the statute of
limitations. If such claims are not discovered and made within the five-year
statute of limitations period, they will be barred and both legal and
marketable title will be vested with the good faith purchaser. At the same
time, should the good faith purchaser not abide by the requirements of the
new discovery rule, he will not receive full title to the artwork.
V. TAX INCENTIVES FOR VOLUNTARY RESOLUTIONS
In order to induce parties to come to a quick resolution, the United
States should also consider implementing tax incentives within the five-year
statute of limitations period for those who return Nazi-looted art to their
original owner. Tax breaks for art loans could further encourage good faith
purchasers to display their artwork for potential discovery by original
owners by having their works "curated, registered, or catalogued." 2 3
3
"Currently, the United States Tax Code allows tax deductions for the
value of gifts of art to public museums" but it trails European countries in
their implementation of tax benefits in promoting the arts.234  Some
European countries provide tax incentives for private owners who loan their
works to public institutions for public display. For instance, England grants
relief from certain capital taxes if an owner makes the work available for
public display. Both Germany and Austria also provide some form of tax
relief for cost-free loans to public museums.235
The United States should consider the availability of tax deductions to
address both the gain to the original owner and the loss to the good faith
purchaser of the Nazi-looted artwork should they decide to voluntarily
settle their claim. Pursuant to the Holocaust Survivor Tax Relief Act, the
United States does not impose federal income tax on amounts received by
Holocaust victims or their heirs.236 Reparation payments made to survivors
of the Holocaust who have been persecuted and suffered damages in some
manner are exempt from the recipient's gross income. The reparation
payments constitute a reimbursement or recompense for the deprivation of
certain civil or personal rights that the victims suffered.237 In California,
property specific payments for the restitution of money in lost bank
accounts, real estate, or other personal property like art, are also exempt
232 Lerner, supra note 205, at 17.
233 Id. at 204.
234 Wilkes, supra note 216, at 203.
235 Joseph L. Sax, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT 66 (1999).
236 Holocaust Survivor Tax Relief Act, H.R. 1292, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
237 Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25 (1956).
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through the Holocaust Reparations Act, which makes tax exemptions for
Holocaust victims or their heirs for income derived from Holocaust claims
settlements against any entity or individual.238 Many other states have also
implemented statutes that exempt state taxation income from Holocaust
reparations.239
A property reparation payment, where the original property is restored
to the Holocaust victim, clearly does not trigger realization or recognition
of gains because the victim is merely being made whole. The U.S. tax
system is based on a horizontal tax equity structure, whereby taxpayers in
similar circumstances are taxed or not taxed in equitable ways. 240 Although
the nature of the injury of the Holocaust victim is incomparable to the loss
incurred by the good faith purchaser of the stolen artwork, a subsequent loss
to the good faith purchaser is also realized when he or she loses title to the
artwork. The good faith purchaser is in essence a victim of fraud. The tax
code should allow the good faith purchaser to claim a loss deduction in the
year of the disposition of the artwork should the good faith purchaser return
the artwork to the original owner. Providing these "stronger incentives to
the wealthy owners of these works, who are consistently seeking
mechanisms by which to offset their tax liability," may encourage more
mutually beneficial settlements as opposed to reliance on the court
system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Particularly with individual countries limiting the ability of claimants
to recover their artwork and the fact that the generation, typically making
these claims, are getting older, individual lawsuits have provided the only
means by which some claimants are able to recover their artwork. While
there have been individual successes like Altmann and Bennigson, the
overall welfare of the art market is in jeopardy. The lack of a binding,
consistent rule of law has resulted in incongruent court decisions,
uncertainty in the potential seizure of artworks loaned to museums
internationally and domestically in the United States, and potential liability
to art dealers and art galleries. To renew confidence in the art market and to
cultivate the exchange of art among different countries, the international
community must first address the tragedy perpetrated by the Holocaust and
238 Holocaust Reparations Act, Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §17155 (1998); see also Harold S.
Peckron, Reparation Payments -An Exclusion Revisited, 34 U.S.F. L. REv. 705 (2000).
239 Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin all have statutes in place.
Michael Bayzler, Federal and State Laws Regarding Holocaust Restitution, at
http://www.pcha.gov/lawsinfo.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
240 Peckron, supra note 238, at 714-15.
241 Wilkes, supra note 216, at 204.
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should do everything possible to come to a harmonized resolution. In the
meantime, the United States should adopt the proposals set forth in the
article to bring about prompt and equitable results to victims of the
Holocaust as well as the victims who in good faith purchased illicit
artworks.
Although these suggestions may seem inconsequential without
international support and uniform adoption, particularly given the
international and multi-jurisdictional nature of the art market, we must
remember that international law is an outgrowth of accepted customs and
practices between nations. Innovations and revisions in international law
are brought about by the action of governments to meet a need and propose
adequate change to an established problem.242 The Altmann decision will
hopefully initiate the necessary dialogue and action among these nations to
press for a prompt and uniform approach as a means to secure and
strengthen the international art market for generations to come.
242 Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the
United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, June 7, 1945, reprinted in 39 AM. J.
INT'LL. 178, 187 (Supp. 1945).
